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ABSTRACT
Inspired by the access control models of social network sys-
tems, Relationship-Based Access Control (ReBAC) was re-
cently proposed as a general-purpose access control paradigm
for application domains in which authorization must take
into account the relationship between the access requestor
and the resource owner. The healthcare domain is envi-
sioned to be an archetypical application domain in which
ReBAC is sorely needed: e.g., my patient record should be
accessible only by my family doctor, but not by all doctors.
In this work, we demonstrate for the first time that Re-
BAC can be incorporated into a production-scale medical
records system, OpenMRS, with backward compatibility to
the legacy RBAC mechanism. Specifically, we extend the
access control mechanism of OpenMRS to enforce ReBAC
policies. Our extensions incorporate and extend advanced
ReBAC features recently proposed by Crampton and Sell-
wood. In addition, we designed and implemented the first
administrative model for ReBAC. In this paper, we describe
our ReBAC implementation, discuss the system engineer-
ing lessons learnt as a result, and evaluate the experimental
work we have undertaken. In particular, we compare the
performance of the various authorization schemes we imple-
mented, thereby demonstrating the feasibility of ReBAC.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Security and Protection]: Access Control
Keywords
Medical records system, relationship-based access control,
authorization graph, authorization principal, administrative
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1. INTRODUCTION
OpenMRS [4] is a production-scale, open-source electronic
medical records system that has been deployed in many
countries, including South Africa, Kenya, Rwanda, India,
China, United States, Pakistan, the Phillipines, etc. Despite
its tremendous success and wide deployment, OpenMRS has
a limitation in its access control mechanism, which is an in-
stantiation of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). This
limitation is the topic of the following posting in the devel-
oper forum [28].
The RBAC system provides a reasonably robust
mechanism for restricting access to system be-
haviours; however, we do not yet have a mecha-
nism for restricting access to specific data (e.g.,
you can see data for patient X, but not patient
Y ; or, you can see your patient’s data except for
specific lab results).
An interpretation of the above limitation is that, while it
is possible to restrict access of patient records to the role
of doctors, it is not possible to restrict access of my pa-
tient record to my family doctor. RBAC satisfies the access
control requirements of business domains in which data ob-
jects are “owned” by the organization, and thus all qualified
personnel (i.e., of a certain role) may be granted access.
In application domains in which privacy is a concern, the
data objects are sometimes “owned” by individuals. There
is now a need for finer-grained access control: e.g., my pa-
tient record shall only be accessible by the clinicians who
are actually treating me. That is, access is granted on the
basis of how the requestors are related to me.
The above access control challenge is one of the primary
motivations for the recently proposed Relationship-Based
Access Control (ReBAC) models. Originally inspired by
the access control models of social network systems (e.g.,
Facebook), ReBAC grants access based on how the access re-
quester is related to the resource owner (e.g., friends, friends-
of-friends). This is in contrast with RBAC, in which access is
granted by considering the attributes of the requestor. Fong
et al. proposed a series of general-purpose ReBAC models
[19, 21, 10], in which ReBAC is envisioned to be applied to
application domains other than social computing, with the
healthcare domain being an archetypical example. While
the idea of ReBAC has undergone a number of recent ex-
tensions in the literature [14, 13, 6, 16, 20, 33], what remains
to be seen is the adoption of ReBAC in a production-scale
system for an application domain other than social comput-
ing. And this is the gap we attempt to bridge by extending
the access control subsystem of OpenMRS to include an im-
plementation of a ReBAC model.
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In this paper, we report our experience of extending the ac-
cess control subsystem of OpenMRS with a ReBAC model.
The “diff”between our extension and the original OpenMRS
code base consists of 25,754 lines (with no context lines).
The extension involves 113 new files, 26 new database ta-
bles, and 15 web pages. Our contributions are the following.
1. We demonstrated for the first time that ReBAC can be
incorporated into a production-scale medical records
system, and did so with backward compatibility to the
legacy RBAC mechanism.
2. We identified system engineering issues that one needs
to address when one is to cleanly and efficiently imple-
ment ReBAC in a large system (§4, §5, §6 and §10).
3. We adapted, extended and implemented the advanced
features of ReBAC that were recently proposed by
Crampton and Sellwood [16]. The implemented fea-
tures include a generalization of social graphs called
authorization graphs (§5), a ReBAC analogue of roles
called authorization principals (§7), and a Unix-style
authorization mechanism for authorization principals
(§8). Because OpenMRS supports a rich mechanism of
privilege matching, the notions of authorization prin-
cipals and authorization algorithms as proposed in [16]
must be either adapted (§7) or extended (§8). Our ex-
tensions involve the proposal of two semantics of au-
thorization (strict-grant vs liberal-grant), as well as
a highly efficient principal matching algorithm based
on the idea of lazy evaluation (lazy-match). What is
pleasantly surprising is that, even after extensive ad-
justments in our implementation, the basic spirit of
Crampton and Sellwood’s design is preserved, thereby
demonstrating the robustness of their proposals.
4. We designed and implemented an administrative model
for ReBAC (§9). To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first such implementation.
5. We empirically evaluated the performance of the vari-
ous authorization schemes in item 3 above (§10).
2. RELATEDWORK
It has long been observed that the health domain requires an
access control model that takes into account the relationship
between the resource owner and the access requestor when
an authorization decision is made [9, 29]. That was partly
the reason that led to the proposal of an extension of Open-
MRS to incorporate parameterized roles [18].
Relationship-Based Access Control was a term coined inde-
pendently by Gates [22] and Carminati and Ferrari [11] to
refer to a paradigm of access control in which authorization
decisions are based on whether the resource owner and the
access requestor are related in a certain way. Initially, Re-
BAC was envisioned to be applied to the domain of social
computing. A seminal work with this application in mind
was that of Carminati et al. [12].
Fong et al. proposed a series of general-purpose ReBAC
models [19, 21, 10], and advocated the adoption of ReBAC
for application domains outside of social computing. The
health domain was envisioned to be an application domain
in which ReBAC is particularly suited. ReBAC protection
states are social networks. Modal logic and hybrid logic were
proposed as policy languages for specifying ReBAC policies
[19, 21, 10].
In UURAC (user-to-user relationship-based access control)
[14], a policy is specified in a regular expression-based pol-
icy language. Access is granted if the resource owner and
the access requestor are connected by a path made up of a
sequence of edge labels satisfying the regular expression. An
algorithm for finding a path that honors the regular expres-
sion is formulated. In a subsequent work [13], the protection
states were extended to track relationships between user and
resources (U2R) as well as between resources and resources
(R2R). Another innovation is the provision for multiple poli-
cies to be applicable to the protection of a resource, and the
design of conflict resolution policies (conjunctive, disjunc-
tive and precedence) to arbitrate authorization decisions.
The work proposes to employ ReBAC to regulate adminis-
trative activities, but does not provide details on how that is
achieved. The administrative actions we proposed in §9 has
clear semantics of how they are protected by security pre-
conditions, and how their executions affect the protection
state.
In [20], a temporal dimension is introduced into ReBAC, so
that access control policies require entities to be related in
a certain way in the past. The goal of this extension is to
support the expression of social contracts in online commu-
nities. In [33], ReBAC is extended to account for geo-social
network systems, and the hybrid logic policy language is
extended to impose relationship constraints over people lo-
cated in a certain geographical neighbourhood.
Crampton and Sellwood recently proposed a series of exten-
sions to ReBAC [16]. The protection state is an authoriza-
tion graph that tracks relationships among users, resources,
as well as other abstract entities relevant to access control
(e.g., groups, roles, etc). They also proposed a ReBAC ana-
logue of roles called authorization principals. The run-time
semantics of authorization principals are specified through
path conditions, a language akin to regular expressions. An
XACML-style conflict resolution mechanism was proposed
to arbitrate authorizations when the access requestor is as-
sociated with authorization principals that grant conflict-
ing authorizations. A UNIX-inspired authorization proce-
dure serves as a framework for binding these technologies
together. Our implementation has adopted the ideas of au-
thorization graphs, authorization principals, and the UNIX-
style authorization procedure. Yet we employ hybrid logic
rather than path conditions for specifying the denotation of
authorization principals. Detailed comparison with [16] will
be given in the rest of this paper.
It has long been recognized that any practical access con-
trol system must provide ways to modify the authorization
state or policy [24, 30]. While administrative access control
models, which control modifications to policies, have been
widely studied for the protection matrix and RBAC, this is a
relatively unexplored area in the context of ReBAC. Fong’s
ReBAC model allows for changes to the protection state
through the use of contexts [19], but we are not aware of
any implementation of administrative features for ReBAC.
3. ReBAC GOES OPEN SOURCE
This section reviews the background materials needed for
understanding the rest of the paper.
3.1 An Overview of ReBAC
In a series of papers [19, 21, 10], Fong et al. proposed a
general-purpose access control model for Relationship-Based
Access Control (ReBAC). This work is mainly based on the
variant of the model discussed in [10].
The protection state of ReBAC is an edge-labelled, directed
graph: directed edges represent interpersonal relationships,
and each edge is labelled with a relation identifier to sig-
nify the type of relation (e.g., patient-of). In the original
conception of ReBAC, vertices represent users, and thus the
protection state is a social network. (In §5, we follow the
proposal of [16], and generalize the social network to an au-
thorization graph.)
A graph predicate determines whether particular condi-
tions, relating the vertices in a graph, hold or not. We
might, for example, define a predicate that returns true
if two vertices are connected by an edge having a partic-
ular label. More formally, a graph predicate of arity k is
a Boolean-valued function GP(G, x1, . . . , xk), where G is a
graph that defines the current protection state of the system,
and each xi is a vertex in G. GP evaluates to 1 if and only
if (x1, . . . , xk) belongs to a k-ary relation defined over G. A
graph predicate of arity 2 is said to be a relationship pred-
icate. The relationship predicate friend-of-friend(G, x1, x2),
for example, returns 1 iff there exists a path of length two
or less in G connecting x1 and x2, where both edges in the
path are labelled with the relationship type friend.
A ReBAC policy has the form “grant access to r if RP eval-
uates to 1”, where r is a resource and RP is a relationship
predicate [10]. An access request has the form (v, r), where
user v wishes to access resource r. Access is permitted if
RP(G, u, v) evaluates to 1, where u is the owner of resource
r. (In §7, we adopt a recent idea due to Crampton and
Sellwood [16], and formulate ReBAC policies in terms of
authorization principals — a ReBAC analogue of roles.)
A graph predicate GP(G, x1, . . . , xk) (with a relationship
predicate as a special case) can be syntactically specified as
a Hybrid Logic formula φ [10] with k free variables.1 A local
model checker is an algorithm that takes as input (i) a hybrid
logic formula φ with k free variables, (ii) a protection state
G, and (iii) k vertices v1, . . . , vk, and then decides whether
the k-ary graph predicate represented by φ is satisfied by v1,
. . . , vk in G.
In the rest of this paper, knowledge of hybrid logic is not nec-
essary for appreciating the contributions of this work. Nev-
ertheless, examples of hybrid logic formulas will be shown
to convey the realism of our design. Readers who are unfa-
miliar with hybrid logic can safely skip those examples.
1More specifically, a graph predicate of arity k can be rep-
resented by a hybrid logic formula φ with k free variables,
such that φ is a Boolean combination of anchored formu-
las. Each anchored formula is one in which the top-level
operator is @x, where x is one of the free variables. This is
a generalization of the syntactic restriction adopted in [10]
for relationship predicates (i.e., arity 2).
3.2 The ReBAC Java Library
A reusable Java library of ReBAC technologies was released
under open-source terms [8]. The library was developed and
maintained separately from OpenMRS. The library was also
packaged as a Maven module for easy integration with large
projects.
A main feature of the ReBAC library is the implementation
of a local model checker for the hybrid logic policy language
of [10]. This model checker is a cornerstone of the autho-
rization mechanism in our OpenMRS extension, allowing us
to determine membership in authorization principal (§7), as
well as to test if an administrative action is enabled and/or
applicable (§8).
Recall that the inputs to a local model checker include a
graph and the abstract syntax tree (AST) of a hybrid logic
formula. To allow the model checker to interoperate with dif-
ferent representations of graphs, we have defined an abstract
interface for graphs. For example, in the case of OpenMRS,
relationship edges may come from three different sources
(§5). A concrete class that makes appropriate queries to
check for existence of each of the three kinds of relation-
ships will implement the abstract graph interface, thereby
allowing the model checker to interoperate with OpenMRS.
Similarly, abstract interfaces are declared for the AST nodes
of hybrid logic formulas. This allows the model checker to
work with different representations of hybrid logic formulas.
One may ask why there is a need for different representa-
tions of hybrid logic formulas. A motivating example comes
from OpenMRS. In OpenMRS, all data objects are stored as
persistent objects (via Hibernate [25]). That includes AST
nodes of hybrid logic formulas. Consequently, there are con-
crete representational demands on how AST node classes
are declared (e.g., must be a subclass of a certain super-
class). Declaring abstract interfaces for AST nodes allows
our model checker to interoperate with such representational
idiosyncrasies.
Other features of the library include an XML parser for hy-
brid logic formulas that are stored as XML files.
4. ARCHITECTURE OF OpenMRS
This section introduces the architecture of OpenMRS, and
explains how ReBAC is built on top of this architecture.
4.1 Interposition via AOP
Our ReBAC implementation is based on the source code of
OpenMRS 1.10.2 OpenMRS is built on the Spring Frame-
work, which is a Java-based web application framework [32].
Core functionalities of OpenMRS are exposed as service-
layer methods on the web application server. The HTML
pages invoke the service-layer methods in order to query ap-
plication data or alter application state. Access control is
achieved by limiting access to the service-layer methods.
Each service-layer method is annotated with either one of
two kinds of guard.3 Intuitively, a guard is a specifica-
2The latest stable version of OpenMRS is 2.0, released on
February 26, 2014.
3Annotation is achieved via the Java custom annotation
tion of privilege requirements that must be satisfied by the
requestor in order for the invocation of the service-layer
method to be allowed.
1. one-of(P): Here P is a set of privileges (i.e., posi-
tive permissions). The intended meaning is that the
invoker of this method must have been granted one of
the privileges in P in order for method invocation to
be authorized.
2. all-of(P): The invoker must have all of the privileges
in P .
Formally, we write Q |= g for a set Q of privileges and a
guard g whenever Q satisfies g in the following sense:
Q |= one-of(P) iff P ∩Q 6= ∅
Q |= all-of(P) iff P ⊆ Q
Intuitively, if a requestor u has been “granted” a set Q of
privileges, and Q |= g, where g is the guard of the method
that u attempts to invoke, then invocation is authorized. (As
we shall see in §8, there are two ways to interpret the word
“granted”, thereby yielding two authorization semantics.)
Spring uses aspect-oriented programming (AOP) [26] to im-
plement interposition of authorization checks. The origi-
nal authorization checking code is implemented as an “ad-
vice”(more precisely, a“before advice”) that is“weaved” into
the entry point of each service-layer method, thereby intro-
ducing additional behaviour on method entry. Thus every
method invocation is intercepted by the RBAC authoriza-
tion mechanism. To implement ReBAC, we introduced an
additional authorization advice. The ReBAC authorization
advice is an “around advice”, which introduces additional
behaviour at both the entry and exit of a method. Conse-
quently every method invocation as well as method return
is intercepted by the ReBAC authorization mechanism.
Lesson 1. Physically localizing all authorization checks
in an identifiable code unit (e.g., module, reference monitor,
aspect, etc) greatly eases the extension of the authorization
mechanism to incorporate ReBAC.
In fact, the above lesson applies generally to all software
systems that anticipate future evolution in their authoriza-
tion mechanisms (incorporating ReBAC is but one possible
evolution), and we have very positive experience with AOP
in this regard.
4.2 Combining RBAC and ReBAC
Unmodified, OpenMRS enforces a Role-Based Access Con-
trol (RBAC) model [31], although the notion of sessions is
not implemented. That is, all roles assigned to a user are
activated when the user logs into the system. The likely
reason is that the notion of role activation is probably too
exotic for medical professionals, and the extra step of role
activation in every log-in attempt would degrade care deliv-
ery efficiency. It has also been pointed out that the support
for sessions is not essential to core RBAC implementations
in certain application domains [27].
mechanism [23, §9.7].
As discussed above, the original RBAC authorization checks
are implemented as an advice. We implemented ReBAC au-
thorization checks as a separate advice. The configuration
is that the RBAC authorization checks are conducted first,
and only when access is granted by RBAC will the ReBAC
authorization checks be conducted. In summary, access is
granted when both the RBAC and ReBAC mechanisms au-
thorize access. We have also tailored configuration files in
such a way that system administrators who do not use the
new ReBAC features will not observe any difference between
the original implementation and the extended one.
Lesson 2 (Backward Compatibility). Care must be
taken to ensure that ReBAC features are backward compati-
ble with the legacy access control model of the system.
Crampton and Sellwood proposed a way of“encoding”RBAC
in their extended ReBAC model [16]. This suggests an alter-
native means for integrating ReBAC and RBAC: implement
only a ReBAC model, and simulate RBAC with ReBAC.
Such an approach would be particularly fitting if the soft-
ware application is written from scratch with a requirement
to support both access control models.
4.3 Protection and Application State
In an application with a traditional access control model
(e.g., RBAC), the protection state (e.g., role hierarchy, user-
role assignment, etc) of the system is separate from its ap-
plication state (i.e., application data). This is true of the
original architecture of OpenMRS.
In social computing systems, however, the above is not nec-
essarily true. For example, the interpersonal relationships
articulated by users in a social network system is both appli-
cation data and part of the protection state: authorization
is granted based on the relationship between the resource
owner and requestor. Inspired by social computing appli-
cations, ReBAC inherits this overlapping of protection and
application state.
The above overlap is also present in the ReBAC extension of
OpenMRS. Included in a patient record is a set of users (e.g.,
family members) related to the patient, as well as their rela-
tionships. This, for example, allows clinicians to anticipate
hereditary conditions, or to identify compatible blood, or-
gan and tissue donors. These relationships obviously belong
to the application state of OpenMRS. Yet, as we shall see
below, ReBAC authorization checks also make use of such
relationships when an authorization decision is computed.
That is, these relationships constitute part of the protection
state.
The above overlap creates something of a dilemma. In the
original OpenMRS architecture, patient relationships are ac-
cessible only via service-layer methods, thereby ensuring
complete mediation. Yet, the ReBAC authorization ad-
vice also needs to access patient relationships. The advice
will therefore need to invoke service-layer methods in order
to access the relationships. As invocations of service-layer
methods are intercepted by the authorization advice, this
inevitably leads to an infinite loop.
All patient data, including patient relationships, are stored
as Hibernate persistent objects [25]. These persistent ob-
jects are made accessible via Data Access Objects (DAOs).
To break the infinite loop, we created direct access paths
to patient relationships by configuring DAOs specifically for
the ReBAC authorization advice, so that the latter may ac-
cess patient relationships without mediation of authorization
checks. The above experience leads to the articulation of the
following general lesson for ReBAC systems.
Lesson 3 (Application and Protection State).
Data belonging to both the application and protection state
of a system must be held in a data store which exposes two
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). One is medi-
ated by authorization checks, the other is not. The mediated
API is invoked by users, while the unmediated one is utilized
internally for authorization.
5. AUTHORIZATION GRAPH
In the early conception of ReBAC [10], the protection state
is a social network of users: an edge-labelled, directed graph
in which vertices represent users and edges model their in-
terpersonal relationships. Crampton and Sellwood proposed
an extension of ReBAC in which the protection state is an
authorization graph [16]. The vertices model not only
users, but also resources as well as other entities that are
relevant to access control (e.g., groups). The edges capture
relationships among users, objects and the aforementioned
entities. Our ReBAC adaptation of OpenMRS implements
the idea of authorization graphs.
When one applies ReBAC to an enterprise application do-
main (i.e., a domain other than social computing), a fre-
quently raised question is: Where do the relationships come
from? This rest of this section reports our answer to this
question, as shaped by our experience with OpenMRS.
In OpenMRS, domain objects are all instances of the root
class BaseOpenmrsObject, which has two subclasses
BaseOpenmrsData and BaseOpenmrsMetadata. The instances
of BaseOpenmrsData include users, patient records and their
components, etc. Therefore, we take all instances of
BaseOpenmrsData as the vertices of the authorization graph.
The authorization graph tracks binary relationships among
instances of BaseOpenmrsData. During our development of
the ReBAC extensions for OpenMRS, we identified three
categories of relationships.
1. User-managed relationships. These are relation-
ships that are explicitly articulated and managed by
end users. An example is friendship in Facebook.
As we mentioned in §4.3, OpenMRS enables a clinician
to document in a patient record the relatives of the
patient. These interpersonal relationships are consid-
ered part of the authorization graph. More specifically,
BaseOpenmrsData has a subclass Person. Recorded in-
terpersonal relationships between instances of Person
are considered to be edges in the authorization graph.
2. System-induced relationships. The data structures
of the system may contain relationships that are rel-
evant to authorization. Examples include organiza-
tional structures, object ownership, object containment
and provenance relationships. End users are not al-
lowed to directly manipulate these relationships.
In our ReBAC adaptation of OpenMRS, we have cre-
ated an extension mechanism for administrators to in-
troduce new system-induced relationships. Specifically,
a system-induced binary relation is implemented as a
Java class that performs queries into the run-time data
structures of OpenMRS. Such a class implements the
ImplicitRelationIdentifier interface, which defines
a standard calling convention for performing relation-
ship queries. At run-time, such a class will be dynami-
cally loaded into the Java Virtual Machine, an instance
of that class is created, and an appropriate method of
that instance will be invoked when the authorization
mechanism needs to check the system-induced relation.
The administrator can install an extension class for
each type of system-induced relationship.
In our ReBAC adaptation of OpenMRS, a system-
induced relation relates instances of BaseOpenmrsData,
meaning that such relationships are not only among
users, but they may also relate resources to resources,
or persons to resources. As an example of the last
case, we implemented resource ownership (owner) as
a system-induced relation, relating a resource to its
owner(s).
3. Access control relationships. There are relation-
ships that belong solely to the protection state: they
are tracked solely for the purpose of access control,
and have no relevance to the business logic of the
application. Examples of access control relationships
include role or group membership, records of access
events (e.g., for implementing history-based policies,
as in [20]), etc.
In our ReBAC adaption of OpenMRS, access control
relationships are defined among instances of the Per-
son class. Manually adding or removing access-control
edges in the authorization graph is an error-prone step.
To reduce the cognitive burden of users, we have imple-
mented an administrative model for ReBAC, thereby
supporting a principled way for adding or removing
access control relationships. See §9 for details.
For example, say the family doctor of a patient may
refer the patient to a specialist. Such a capability is
only allowed if patient and a clinician are related by
an access control relationship family-doctor. Once the
referral is confirmed, the patient and the specialist will
be related by the access control relationship referred-
clinician, thereby enabling the specialist to access the
patient’s record.
Lesson 4. In a ReBAC system, relationships come from
three sources. Some relationships belong purely to the pro-
tection state (i.e., access control relationships): these are
managed by system administrators. Other relationships are
shared between the application state and the protection state.
This latter kind may be further classified into (i) relation-
ships that are explicitly articulated and managed by end users,
and (ii) relationships that are induced by the system data
structure (and thus cannot be manipulated directly by users
and administrators).
6. ACCESS REQUESTS
The ReBAC authorization advice needs three pieces of in-
formation to compute an authorization decision: (a) the re-
source r to which access is required, (b) the user u who
wishes to have access (aka the “requestor”), and (c) the
guard g of the service-layer method being invoked. There-
fore, an access request in OpenMRS is characterized by a
triple (r, u, g).
The ReBAC authorization advice can discover the identity
of the requestor (u) and the service-layer method that is
being invoked.4 Using the Java Reflection API, the Re-
BAC authorization advice can then extract the guard (g)
of the service-layer method. The last component of the ac-
cess request, namely the resource r, is not directly available.
OpenMRS was originally designed to use RBAC for autho-
rization, and that explains why the identity of the resource
is not explicitly made available for the authorization mech-
anism. In the following, we discuss how the requested re-
source r is identified in a systematic manner for the ReBAC
authorization advice.
The ReBAC authorization advice has access to the argu-
ments that are passed to the service-layer method, as well
as the return value of that invocation. Depending on the
kind of service-layer method, the target resource may be ei-
ther (a) an argument or (b) the return value. There are two
kinds of service layer methods in OpenMRS:
1. A setter method is one that operates on a given re-
source, which appears as one of the method arguments.
That is, a setter produces side effects on the applica-
tion state. The argument for which side effect is tar-
geted is the resource that requires access control.
2. A getter method retrieves patient information (e.g.,
searching for the records of all patients with a given
family name). The return value of a getter method is
either (a) a single piece of patient information, or (b) a
collection or a map of patient information. In the for-
mer case, the returned patient datum is the resource
that requires access control, and in the latter case, ev-
ery returned patient datum requires access control.
In the original design of OpenMRS, a naming convention is
adopted to differentiate getter and setter methods, but there
is no way for the ReBAC authorization advice to recognize
which argument of a setter requires access control.
To address the above problem, we designed a custom anno-
tation @Resource for identifying (a) whether a service-layer
method is a setter or a getter, and (b) the target resource for
each kind. In the case of setter methods, the @Resource an-
notation can be applied to a method parameter to indicate
that that parameter corresponds to a protected resource.
T m(T1 x1, @Resource T2 x2, T3 x3) { ... }
The @Resource annotation is applied above to explicitly de-
4The requestor can be identified by calling a public static
method of the Context class in OpenMRS. The ReBAC au-
thorization method is passed an argument of type Method-
Invocation, which in turn provides access to the identity of
the service-layer method that is being invoked.
clare that the parameter x2 of method m is a controlled
resource. We systematically annotated the setter methods
in the OpenMRS code base using the above annotation.
When the authorization advice is invoked, it employs the
Java Reflection API to discover if any of the parameters of
the invoked method is annotated by @Resource. If so, then
it will pass the request (r, u, g) through the authorization
procedure, where r is the value of the annotated parameter.
Invocation of the method is only granted if authorization is
successful.
Similarly, the @Resource annotation can also be applied to
the method as a whole to declare that the method is a getter
and thus the return value requires access control.5
@Resource T m(T1 x1, T2 x2, ...) { ... }
Again, we systematically annotated the getter methods in
the OpenMRS code base using the above annotation.
Before an invoked method returns, the ReBAC authoriza-
tion advice will check if the method has the @Resource an-
notation. If so, it will perform authorization checks on the
return value. If the return value is a single piece of patient
information r, then the request (r, u, g) will be subject to
the authorization procedure, and a security exception will
be raised if authorization fails. Otherwise, the return value
is either a collection or a map of patient information. For
every member r in the returned collection (resp. map), the
request (r, u, g) will be subject to authorization check. A
collection (resp. map) containing only those rs that pass au-
thorization will be returned.
Lesson 5. The legacy authorization subsystem of some
applications may not have direct access to both the requestor
and the resource of an access request. A ReBAC extension
of such applications will need to provide means for run-time
identification of these two entities.
7. AUTHORIZATION PRINCIPALS
In an early conception of ReBAC [10], a ReBAC policy has
the form “grant access to r if RP”, where r is a resource
and RP is a relationship predicate. There are two limita-
tions to this design. First, access to resource r may be per-
formed via many different forms of operations, and thus finer
grained access control based on permissions (i.e., privileges
in OpenMRS) is desirable. Second, there is no provision of
permission abstraction (i.e., such as roles in RBAC) to ease
administration. To overcome these limitations, Crampton
and Sellwood [16] proposed an extension of ReBAC that is
based on permission granting, and invented the notion of
authorization principals, which could be seen as a Re-
BAC analogue of roles, to ease administration. In our Re-
BAC extension of OpenMRS, we have adopted a variant of
5The annotation of getter methods is not absolutely nec-
essary, as the above-mentioned naming convention already
identifies getter methods. The annotation is performed as a
convenience for the ReBAC authorization advice. The an-
notation of setter methods, however, is necessary in order
for the ReBAC authorization advice to function properly.
Crampton and Sellwood’s proposal. In the following, we
will first describe the scheme that we actually implemented,
and then discuss how it differs from the original proposal of
Crampton and Sellwood.
An authorization principal is defined via a principal match-
ing rule of the form (AP ,RP), where AP is the identifier of
the authorization principal, and RP is a relationship pred-
icate. Unlike a role in RBAC, in which membership in a
role is defined statically (via the user-role assignment re-
lation UA), the semantics of an authorization principal is
dynamic. When a request to access resource r is issued (at
run time), AP denotes the set of users u for which r and
u satisfy RP , the relationship predicate that is associated
with AP . This notion of authorization principals is actually
familiar to us. For example, in Unix, there are three built-
in authorization principals: “owner”, “group”, “other” (aka
“world”); in Facebook, there are four built-in authorization
principals: “me”, “friend”, “friend-of-friend”, “everyone”.
Note again that, in the original conception of ReBAC [10],
the relationship predicate in a ReBAC policy specifies a
desired relation between the resource owner and the ac-
cess requestor. In contrast, the relationship predicate in
a principal matching rule specifies a desired relation be-
tween the resource itself and the requestor. For example,
the following principal matching rule specifies the principal
treating-clinician.(
treating-clinician,
@resource〈owner〉
(〈family-doctor〉requestor ∨
〈referred-clinician〉requestor))
The rule says that the requestor is a treating clinician if
she is either the family doctor or a referred specialist of the
resource’s owner. Note that the two free variables resource
and requestor identifies the two parameters of the relation-
ship predicates.
In our implementation, there is only one principal matching
rule for each authorization principal AP : i.e., the princi-
pal matching rule defines a functional mapping from autho-
rization principals to their corresponding relationship pred-
icates. We write RPAP for the relationship predicate of the
authorization principal AP .
Permission abstraction is achieved by authorization rules of
the form (AP , P ), where AP is the identifier of an autho-
rization principal, and P is a set of privileges. The meaning
is analogous to the permission assignment relation PA in
RBAC. That is, at run time, the members of authorization
principal AP is granted permissions in P .
In our implementation, there is only one authorization rule
for each authorization principal. We write PAP for the set
of privileges granted to authorization principal AP .
The scheme we implemented differs from the original pro-
posal of Crampton and Sellwood in the following manners.
• Crampton and Sellwood use a formalism called path
conditions to specify the relationship predicate RP . In
our implementation, RP is specified via a hybrid logic
formula. Path conditions and hybrid logic have incom-
parable expressiveness. There are certain relationship
predicates that are expressible in hybrid logic but not
path conditions, and vice versa. Extending our im-
plementation to accommodate other specification for-
malisms for relationship predicates is a modular task.
• In Crampton and Sellwood’s proposal, an authoriza-
tion rule may grant either positive or negative permis-
sions (i.e., allow or deny). Complying to the origi-
nal design of OpenMRS, our implementation supports
only positive permissions. Without negative permis-
sions, the conflict resolution strategies proposed in [16]
are not needed and thus not implemented. Extension
of our implementation to accomodate negative permis-
sions and conflict resolution is a tractable endeavour.
• An authorization rule of Crampton and Sellwood has
an explicitly specified scope of applicability. Specifi-
cally, a rule is either applicable to all resources, or it is
applicable only to a specific resource r. Our implemen-
tation supports only the first possibility (applicable to
all resources).
A number of user interface elements have been introduced
to ease the administration of authorization principals and
privilege assignment. First, the specification of principal
matching rules and the specification of authorization rules
are performed in two separate web pages. Each web page is
protected by separate privileges. This separation of duty al-
lows a different group of administrators to be responsible for
specifying each kind of rules. Second, we have developed a
Javascript-based structure editor for specifying Hybrid Logic
formulas (e.g., as relationship predicates in principal match-
ing rules).
8. AUTHORIZATION MECHANISM
Inspired by the UNIX access control model [15], Crampton
and Sellwood proposed an authorization mechanism for de-
termining when a request is to be granted. We adapted their
proposal for OpenMRS. Given an access request (r, u, g)
directed against a protection state (i.e., an authorization
graph) G, an authorization principal AP is said to be en-
abled iff RPAP (G, r, u) = 1. Intuitively, the requestor u is
a member of the enabled principals for the present access
request. Thus, requestor u is granted the privileges in PAP ,
for each enabled principal AP . Such privileges are then used
for satisfying the privilege requirement of guard g.
The presence of guards of the form all-of(P) present ambi-
guities in the precise manner in which authorization should
be conducted. We therefore extend the proposal of Cramp-
ton and Sellwood by differentiating between two semantics
of authorization.
1. Liberal-grant semantics.
• Let E be the set of all enabled principals.
• Let Q = ⋃AP∈E PAP . That is, Q is the set of all
privileges that are granted by at least one enabled
principal.
• Authorization is granted iff Q |= g.
In liberal-grant authorization, the privileges required
by g may come from any enabled principals. The as-
sumption is that the requestor u can simultaneously
“be” all the enabled principals.
2. Strict-grant semantics.
• Let E be the set of all enabled principals.
• Authorization is granted iff there exists AP ∈ E
such that PAP |= g.
In strict-grant authorization, the privileges required by
g must originate from only one enabled principal. The
idea is that the privilege requirements of g are satisfied
only if there is an enabled principal who can “single-
handedly” satisfy it.
The two semantics produce identical behaviour if the guard
g is of the form one-of(P).6 They differ in behaviour only
if the guard is of the form all-of(P).7 If a request is au-
thorized in the strict-grant semantics then it is authorized
in the liberal-grant semantics.8
For each of the above semantics, we also developed two im-
plementations.
1. Eager-match strategy . This is the straightforward
implementation of the two semantics, in which the set
of all enabled principals is computed before an autho-
rization decision is produced.
2. Lazy-match strategy . This is an optimized imple-
mentation of the two semantics. The core idea is that
the testing of relationship predicates during principal
matching (i.e., determining which principals are en-
abled) is an expensive operation, and thus such checks
should be avoided whenever possible. This idea is ma-
terialized in two ways. First, two principals may share
the same relationship predicate. There is no point re-
evaluating the predicate for both principals. When we
determine what principals are enabled, the same re-
lationship predicate is evaluated only once. Second,
rather than computing the set of all enabled autho-
rization principals, they are computed one at a time,
and only for the principals that are relevant. If the
privileges associated with a principal do not contribute
to the satisfaction of the guard in question, it is ig-
nored, and its relationship predicate is not even eval-
uated. Otherwise, the principal is “relevant”, and its
relationship predicate is checked to see if the principal
is enabled. Whenever a relevant principal is found to
be enabled, the authorization engine checks to see if
the required privileges are already present. If so, the
search for enabled principals will be terminated. In
summary, this “lazy” evaluation strategy opportunis-
tically eschews unnecessary computation. The pseu-
docode listings for liberal-grant and strict-grant au-
thorization using the lazy-match strategy are shown
in Algorithms 1 and 2 respectively.
6If g = one-of(P), then P ∩ (⋃AP∈E PAP ) 6= ∅ iff there
exists AP ∈ E such that P ∩ PAP 6= ∅. That is, the two
semantics agree in their authorization decisions.
7Suppose g = all-of({p1, p2}). Suppose further E =
{AP1,AP2}. Say PAP1 = {p1} and PAP2 = {p2}. Then
liberal grant semantics will allow access but strict grant se-
mantics will deny access.
8Suppose strict-grant allows access. There exists AP ∈ E
such that PAP |= g. In that case, ⋃AP∈E PAP |= g as well,
since |= is monotonic. Thus, liberal grant allows access also.
Algorithm 1: Lazy-match, liberal-grant authorization of
access request (r, u, g) against authorization graph G.
1 let P be such that g is either all-of(P ) or one-of(P );
2 Q := ∅;
3 foreach AP do
4 if (PAP \Q) ∩ P 6= ∅ then
5 if RPAP (G, r, u) has been evaluated then
6 reuse previous value;
7 else
8 compute value;
9 if value is true then
10 Q := Q ∪ PAP ;
11 if Q |= g then
12 return “allow”;
13 return “deny”;
Algorithm 2: Lazy-match, strict-grant authorization of ac-
cess request (r, u, g) against authorization graph G.
1 foreach AP do
2 if PAP |= g then
3 if RPAP (G, r, u) has been evaluated then
4 reuse previous value (which must be false);
5 else
6 compute value;
7 if value is true then
8 return “allow”;
9 return “deny”;
The two strategies produce the same authorization decision
for any given access request.
We implemented a web interface for administrators to se-
lect between liberal- or strict-grant semantics, and between
eager- or lazy-match strategy (i.e., four combinations).
9. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
Access control relationships in the authorization graph be-
long solely to the protection state. They are not application
data. Their existence serve only the purpose of protection.
One way of managing such relationships will be to place the
burden entirely on the system administrators. (In our imple-
mentation, we have administrative web pages for adminis-
trators to manually add or delete edges of the authorization
graph.) This, however, is not scaleable. Imagine the task of
adding an edge in the authorization graph to indicate that
the family doctor of a patient is referring the patient to a
cardiologist (and thus the said cardiologist enjoys certain
access rights that other cardiologists do not have over the
patient’s records). Such an action is common in the daily
operation of a health service. It is completely impractical
to go through the bottleneck of the system administrators
every time such a referral is made. One way of making this
scaleable is to delegate this operation to qualified users (e.g.,
the family doctor in the example), so that the latter may add
this edge into the authorization graph. Yet, manual addi-
tion and deletion of edges can be error prone. First, business
logic may dictate that multiple updates to the authorization
graph must occur together (e.g., a person may have only one
supervisor, and thus the addition of a new supervisor edge
must be accompanied by the deletion of an out-of-date su-
pervisor edge). If the user performs one update but forgets
another, then the integrity of the authorization graph can-
not be maintained. Second, business logic may dictate that
an update can only occur if the user performing the update
is qualified to do so (e.g., referral can only be made by a
family doctor). Undisciplined updates of the authorization
graph overlooks such security requirements.
The primary design objective of administrative actions is to
provide a structured means for adding and removing access
control relationships, so that such tasks can be performed
safely by users other than system administrators. In our
design, the declaration of an administrative action consists
of the following components:
• Action identifier: A unique name is used for iden-
tifying the administrative action. For example, the
referral action is identified by the identifier “Referral”.
• Enabling precondition: Every administrative ac-
tion is presumed to be performed by a user against a
patient (e.g., a family doctor performing a referral for a
patient). So every administrative action has two pri-
mary participants, namely, the user who performs
that action and the patient to which the action is tar-
geted. The identifiers user and patient are used in the
declaration for referring to the primary participants.
Whether the action is enabled (see below) depends on
whether the user and the participants satisfy a certain
relationship predicate. Such a relationship predicate,
called the enabling precondition, is specified as a hy-
brid logic formula with free variables user and patient.
For example, the following hybrid logic formula can be
used for requiring that referral can only be conducted
by the family doctor of a patient.9
@user〈family-doctor〉patient
• Participants: Other than user and patient, there may
be other participants involved in the action. They are
called auxiliary participants. The participant list
enumerates the identifiers to be used for referring to
auxiliary participants in the rest of the declaration.
In the example of referral, there is only one auxiliary
participant, “specialist”, who is the specialist to which
the referral is directed.
• Applicability precondition: Whether the adminis-
trative action is considered applicable (see below) de-
pends on whether a certain condition holds among all
the participants (both primary and auxiliary). Such
a condition is specified as a hybrid logic formula con-
taining free variables that are user, patient, as well as
the identifiers listed in the participant list above. The
hybrid logic formula specifies a graph predicate of arity
`+ 2, where ` is the number of auxiliary participants.
In the running example, we require that (a) the spe-
cialist is approved by the insurance company of the
user, and (b) the user and the specialist must belong
to the same health region. The above conditions are
9This is only an illustration. We are fully aware that in real
life it is not just the family doctor who can perform referral.
captured by the following hybrid logic formula.(
@patient〈insurance〉〈approves〉specialist
) ∧(
@user〈region〉〈−region〉specialist
)
• Effects: The effects of an administrative action is a
list of updates. Each update is of the form “add
i(x, y)” or “del i(x, y)”. Here, i is a relation identi-
fier (e.g., supervisor-of), and x and y are identifiers of
participants (either primary or auxiliary). The key-
words add and del indicates whether the update is an
edge addition or deletion.
For example, the referral action has one update:
add referred-clinician(patient, specialist)
The enabling and applicability preconditions together spec-
ify the security constraints that must be met in order for
the user to be allowed to perform the administrative action
against the patient. The effects may involve updating mul-
tiple edges in the authorization graph. Grouping them to-
gether in one administrative action ensures that the updates
are either performed together, or not at all. This in turn en-
sures the integrity of the authorization graph, and prevents
errors on the part of the user who performs the updates.
At run time, the following sequence of events occur, which
gives semantics to administrative actions.
1. When a user retrieves the record of a patient, the two
primary participants are tested against the enabling
precondition of every declared administrative action.
An action for which the enabling precondition is satis-
fied is said to be enabled . The set of enabled actions
is computed.
2. When the patient record is displayed, a tab showing
the list of all enabled actions is made available to the
user. The user may choose to perform any of the en-
abled actions.
3. When the user signals to perform an enabled action,
the list of auxiliary participants (if any) will be dis-
played to the user. The user must now instantiate
each of the participants by selecting a person. This
is facilitated by intelligent search features offered by
OpenMRS.
4. Once the participants are selected, both the enabling
and applicability preconditions are checked. The ac-
tion is deemed applicable if the check succeeds. (We
will explain below why the enabling precondition is
checked again.)
5. If the action is applicable, then the effects of the action
will be executed. Note that deleting a non-existent
edge is an error. Similarly, adding an edge that al-
ready exists is also considered an error. Either all the
updates are executed, or execution fails without any
change to the authorization graph.
Note that the execution of effects is an atomic operation: ei-
ther all updates are successfully executed, or else no update
is performed. This is achieved by the transaction manager.
Actually, the transaction begins at step 4 above. Includ-
ing the check of both enabling and application precondi-
tions into the transaction prevents time-of-check-to-time-of-
use (TOCTTOU) race conditions [7, §6.2.1]. In addition, to
Figure 1: The 8 experimental configurations.
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Figure 2: RBAC Parameters
prevent unintended roll-back, the preconditions should be
crafted in such a way that the presence of an edge is verified
in the preconditions if it is deleted in the effects, and the
absence of an edge is confirmed in the preconditions if it is
added in the effects.
To support policy engineering, we also developed adminis-
trative web pages for users to build a library of reusable
hybrid logic formulas. Such formulas can be referenced in
the declarations of administrative actions.
10. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
An empirical study has been conducted to evaluate the per-
formance of the various authorization schemes proposed in
this paper. As our ReBAC-equipped version of OpenMRS is
not yet deployed in any clinical setting, no production data
set is available, and thus performance evaluation was con-
ducted with synthetic data. Rather than performing “dis-
embodied” simulation of the various authorization schemes,
we measured the performance of those schemes within the
infrastructure of OpenMRS, thereby capturing the overhead
in a realistic implementation.
We compared the performance of the OpenMRS authoriza-
tion mechanism in eight different configurations (Fig. 1).
The two RBAC configurations (Ro*) correspond to Open-
MRS with only the legacy RBAC authorization mechanism
(i.e., ReBAC is turned off). These two configurations dif-
fer in whether requests are directed against one-of guards
(RoOne) or all-of guards (RoAll). ReBAC authorization
is turned on (and RBAC is turned off) for the remaining
six configurations (Re*). Two of the ReBAC configura-
tions correspond to one-of requests (ReOne*). They differ
in whether eager- or lazy-match strategy is implemented.
The last four ReBAC configurations correspond to all-of
requests (ReAll*). In the case of all-of guards, there are
two possible semantics (liberal- or strict-grant), as well as
two possible matching strategies (eager or lazy), resulting in
four configurations: ReAllEgLib, ReAllEgStr, ReAllLzLib, and
ReAllLzStr.
RBAC Protection State. We randomly synthesized an
RBAC protection state for the two RBAC configurations
(Ro*). OpenMRS pre-compiles the role hierarchy into a flat
space of roles. The RBAC protection state therefore con-
tains a user-role assignment and a privilege-role assignment,
but not a role hierarchy. Fig. 2 enumerates the parameters
used for synthesizing the RBAC protection state. Justifi-
cations for the choice of these parameters are given in Ap-
pendix A.
ReBAC Protection State. For the six ReBAC configu-
rations (Re*), we constructed an authorization graph out
of a social network dataset, soc-Pokec, obtained from the
Stanford Large Network Dataset Collection [5]. The graph
has 1.6 million nodes and 30 million directed edges. This
dataset is thus even bigger than what the OpenMRS com-
munity calls a high-density deployment.10
To construct the authorization graph, we identified 10,000
nodes with the highest in-degrees, and labelled them as users
(i.e., clinicians).11 The remaining nodes are patients. Con-
sequently, a directed edge in the social graph can be one of
four types: user-user, user-patient, patient-user, or patient-
patient. According to the type of each directed edge, we then
randomly labelled the directed edges using the relation iden-
tifiers of the Electronic Health Records System case study
in [19, §5]. A detailed list of relation identifiers and the
distribution of the edge labels can be found in Appendix B.
ReBAC Policies. The six ReBAC configurations (Re*)
presumes the existence of ReBAC policies (authorization
principals). We generated an authorization principal for
each of the 67 roles. Authorization rules were formulated
in such a way that each principal grants the same privi-
leges as its corresponding role. Principal matching rules
were in place so that every authorization principal is as-
sociated with a randomly generated hybrid logic formula.
Specifically, from the two example formulas in the Electronic
Health Records System case study in [19, §5], we extracted
ten hybrid logic formulas for our experiment. For each prin-
cipal, a formula was randomly selected from those ten for-
mulas (with equal probability). See Appendix C for details.
Methods, Guards, and Requests. As the existing service-
layer methods of OpenMRS will not work with the autho-
rization graph synthesized above, we randomly synthesized
service-layer methods for the purpose of this experiment.
Each synthesized service-layer method takes a patient as an
argument, and is invoked by a user (i.e., clinician). A guard
is randomly generated for each method; one-of guards for
the *One* configurations, and all-of guards for the *All*
configurations. Each method has an empty body as we
are only concerned about authorization overhead. For each
of the eight configurations, we generated 200 method calls,
with randomly selected clinicians and patients. The autho-
rization times of the 200 method calls are then averaged and
reported. Details can be found in Appendix D.
Results and Discussions. We conducted the experiment
on a desktop machine with AMD FX-8350 8-core Processor
10According to a thread in the OpenMRS developer forum
[1], the number of patient records in various reported Open-
MRS deployments ranges from 8,982 to 741,606.
11Our intuition is that clinicians are more connected than
patients. Specifically, they have more incoming edges, for
example, to indicate who is the attending clinician of whom.
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Figure 3: Average time for an authorization check
(with 95% confidence interval).
(16 MB cache), 16 GB RAM (1866 MHz, DDR3), and an
840 EVO Solid State Drive running Windows 8 OS. The
results are shown in Fig. 3.
The baseline RBAC configurations (Ro*) incur negligible
running time. The three eager-match configurations (*Eg*)
have authorization time averaging around 0.33 seconds, sug-
gesting that the eager-match strategy is not practical. In
contrast, all the lazy-match configurations (*Lz*) have com-
petitive authorization times averaging around 0.016–0.037
seconds. In summary, matching strategy, and not autho-
rization semantics, is the key determinant of performance.
In our experience, the main performance overhead comes not
from backtracking within the hybrid logic model checker, but
from database accesses. Due to the sheer size of the autho-
rization graph (1.6 million nodes, 30 million edges), simply
retrieving the neighbours of a given node takes 0.002 second
in our preliminary experiments, resulting in unacceptable
authorization times. Noticing this, we stored the access con-
trol relationships in a graph database (Neo4j [3]) instead of
the original relational database (MySQL [2]), resulting in a
20-fold speed-up in neighbor retrieval time (0.0001 sec) and
thus the fast authorization times reported above (Fig. 3).
Lesson 6. A graph database offers more competitive Re-
BAC authorization performance than a relational database.
11. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
This ReBAC adaptation of OpenMRS is the first implemen-
tation of ReBAC in a production-scale electronic medical
records system. We reported reusable engineering lessons
for ReBAC deployment, presented extensions of advanced
ReBAC features recently proposed by Crampton and Sell-
wood [16], designed and implemented the first administra-
tive model for ReBAC, and evaluated the performance of
authorization checks.
Our implementation can serve as a testbed for future ex-
tensions of ReBAC. A number of research opportunities are
motivated by this implementation exercise. First, the way
ReBAC interacts with the legacy RBAC mechanism is by
way of conjunction: access is granted if both access con-
trol subsystem grant access. What are other ways in which
RBAC and ReBAC can interact with one another to deliver
advanced access control features? Second, authorization in
OpenMRS is performed through the satisfaction of privilege
requirements known as guards. These privilege requirements
interact with the design of other access control features (e.g.,
authorization principals, authorization algorithms, positive
and negative permissions, conflict resolution) in an intimate
manner. We have opted for simplicity in most of our design
choices. Further studies on how advanced access control
features can be implemented in the presence of OpenMRS-
style privilege requirements is a research challenge. Third,
while we have fashioned the first administrative model for
ReBAC, the theory of ReBAC administrative models is an
unexplored area. How does one perform, say, safety analysis
in this administrative model [24]? Fourth, in the original
proposal of ReBAC [19] relationships are contextual. For
example, a referral relationship is effective only in the con-
text of a certain medical case. Context creation and removal
provide a clean mechanism for expiration of tentative rela-
tionships. How does one implement contexts in OpenMRS,
especially with usability in mind?
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APPENDIX
A. RBAC PROTECTION STATE
We create 10,000 users for our experiments. Since OpenMRS
has 184 distinct built-in privileges, we round up and thus
create 200 privileges. We deduce several ratios from the
“healthcare” database of [17]: (a) role-to-privilege ratio is
1:3; (b) average number of roles per user is 5; (c) average
number of privilege per role is 7. From these ratios, we create
67 roles (≈ 200/3), 469 privilege-role assignment pairs (≈
67×7), and 50,000 user-role assignment pairs (≈ 10000×5).
B. ReBAC PROTECTION STATE
From [19, §5], we extract the following relation identifiers.
We indicate below the type of each identifier: e.g., an iden-
tifier of the patient-user type is identified by “p-u”.
Rel. Id. Type Rel. Id. Type
gp p-u register-ward p-u
referrer u-u ward-nurse u-u
appoint-team u-u agent p-p
team u-u
Every directed edge in the social graph belongs to one of
the four types: user-user, user-patient, patient-user, patient-
patient. Based on the type of a given directed edge, a rela-
tion identifier of that type is random selected (with uniform
distribution). Note that there is no relation identifier that
has the type user-patient. For those edges, a dummy rela-
tion identifier is assigned.
C. ReBAC POLICIES
The Electronic Health Records System case study of [19,
§5] has two formulas that we can use in our experiments.
The first formula, specifying the patient-clinician relation,
is constructed incrementally in four stages in [19, §5.1]. We
take the subformulas constructed in the various stages as
candidate formulas for our experiment.
φ1 = 〈gp〉requestor
φ2 = 〈gp〉〈−referrer〉requestor
φ3 = φ1 ∨ φ2
φ4 = 〈gp〉〈−referrer〉〈appoint-team〉requestor
φ5 = 〈gp〉〈−referrer〉〈appoint-team〉(requestor ∨
〈member〉requestor)
φ6 = φ3 ∨ φ5
φ7 = 〈register-ward〉requestor
φ8 = 〈register-ward〉(requestor ∨
〈ward-nurse〉requestor)
φ9 = φ6 ∨ φ8
The last candidate formula is basically a minor adaptation
of the formula expressing the agency relation in [19, §5.2].
φ10 = 〈gp〉requestor ∨ 〈−agent〉〈gp〉requestor
D. AUTHORIZATION REQUESTS
We generated 400 methods with all-of guards, and another
400 with one-of guards. The set P of privileges for each
guard contains a minimum of one and a maximum of three
privileges randomly selected from the 200 available privileges
(Fig. 2).12 In addition to the privileges we randomly gener-
ated a list of 400 clinician, and a list of 400 participants, to
serve as participants in the authorization requests.
The methods were invoked in order (from 1 to 400) along
with the corresponding clinician, patient pair. This pro-
cess was uniformly conducted for all configurations, with the
*One* configurations invoking the methods with the one-of
guards, and the *All* configurations invoking the methods
with the all-of guards. The first 200 method invocations
were discarded as they were used for warming up the Java
Virtual Machine. The performance of the remaining 200
method invocations were recorded.
E. Neo4j WARMUP
Retrieving the neighbourhood in Neo4J normally start out
slow then speeds up, and stabilize at an average of 0.0001
seconds after approximately 250 queries. Therefore, we ran-
domly generated 250 distinct neighbourhood retrieval queries
that were ran before the method invocations for each test
configuration.
12The service-layer methods of OpenMRS never have a priv-
ilege set of size larger three.
